Table of contents : Introduction
1. Politics and Power in Economic Organizations
The Abuse of Power in Competitive Exchange S. Bowles
Political Corruption and the Market Economy M. Franzini
The Internal Politics of the Firm P. Milgrom and J. Roberts
Is Power an Economic Good? U. Pagano
How Politics Limits Markets: Power, Legitimacy and Choice J. Dunn
2. The Economic Analysis of Political Organizations
Notes on the Economic Analysis of Politics A. Breton
Political Parties and Representative Democracy G. Galeotti
Constitutional Constrained and Safeguarded Competition in Markets and Politics, with reference to a European Constitution V. Vanberg
Political Parties, Pressure Groups and Democracy: A Transaction Cost Theory of Political Institutions D. Wittman
3. The 'Contamination' between Economic and Political Factors in Institutional Changes
The Coming of Nationalism and its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class E. Gellner
Norms of Exclusion R. Hardin
From Expressionism to Kitsch: Ethnic and Intergenerational Conflict and the Rise of Dictatorship R. Wintrobe
Multiple Equilibria, Critical Masses and Intstitutional Change: THe Coup d'Etat Problem U. Witt
Contributor Information :Samuel Bowles, University of Massachusetts, Herbert Gintis, University of Massachusetts, Maurizio Franzini, Universita degli studi di Siena, Paul Milgrom, Stanford University, John Roberts, Stanford University, Ugo Pagano, Universita degli Studi di Siena, John Dunn, University of Cambridge, Albert Breton, University of Toronto, Gianluigi Galeotti, Universita di Roma "La Sapienza", Viktor Vanberg, George Mason, Donald Wittman, University of California Santa Cruz, E. Gellner, Russel Hardin, New York University, Ronald Wintrobe, University of Western Ontario, Ulrich Witt, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems
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